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PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE IN PROSEOUTIONS UNDER
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACTS
O NE of the most difficult problems confronting criminal au-
thorities and the courts is the method of dealing with the
habitual criminal. The original view was that the solution lay in
special legislation imposing aggravated penalties for subsequent
convictions of criminal offenses. Consequently, in the past seventy
years the federal government' and all but five states have adopted
habitual criminal acts.2 These statutes vary considerably regard-
ing the penalties imposed, the nature of the crimes necessary to
invoke them, and the cnumber of offenses required for them to be
applicable.3 By increasing the punishment imposed for second or
subsequent convictions, these statutes serve a dual purpose. Not
only do they operate as a warning to first and second offenders, but
they also prevent the further commission of crimes by the in-
corrigible criminal by confining him for extended periods of time.
Although these statutes have repeatedly been subjected to con-
stitutional attack, they have been sustained on the ground that the
aggravated punishment is imposed only for the second offense,
and that a court may properly consider the defendant's past con-
victions in determining the punishment to be inflicted.4 Accordingly
the prevailing view in jurisdictions with habitual criminal statutes
is that prior offenses constitute an essential element 5 of the instant
crime. As a result, the usual practice under these statutes is to
allege both the instant crime and the habitual counts in the same
1. 65 STAT. 767, 26 U.S.C. §2557 (Supp. 1952). The federal provision applies
only to subsequent narcotics offenders.
2. See text infra.
3. There are several types of habitual criminal statutes which increase punish-
ment for crimes on the basis of prior convictions. First, there are those which
impose a life sentence or other long term imprisonment upon the third or fourth
conviction of a felony. Next are the "second offense" statutes which provide for
an increased penalty for the second conviction of certain enumerated crimes. A
third type of statute imposes increasing periods of incarceration for second and
third offenses. Finally, there are statutes which provide for imprisonment for
stipulated periods of time for repeated convictions of petty crimes. See Note, 51
HARV. L. REv. 345 (1937).
4. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901). Habitual criminality is a
status rather than an offense. People v. Jeff ries, 47 Cal. App. 2d 801, 119 P.2d 190
(1941) ; People v. Langford, 392 Il1. 584, 65 N.E.2d 440 (1946) ; Sammons v. State,
210 Ind. 40, 199 N.E. 555 (1936); State v. Bohannon, 361 Mo. 380, 234 S.W.2d
793 (1950).
5. People v. Madden, 384 Ill. 313, 51 N.E.2d 527 (1943).
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pleading, with the jury, or the court if a jury is waived, trying both
issues simultaneously. 6
The widespread adoption of habitual criminal legislation has
proved to be an effective tool for dealing with the second offender.
Yet this very legislation has created a new problem-that of pro-
viding fair procedural safeguards in its application.
Practice Under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Statute
The Illinois act 7 specifically requires that the fact of prior con-
victions and imprisonment in the penitentiary be pleaded in the
same indictment as the instant crime.8 The act further provides
that an authenticated copy of the records showing prior convictions
may be introduced and will be prima facie evidence of such former
convictions. 9 These provisions have, in effect, established a rule
of evidence which enables the prosecution to present evidence of a
defendant's prior convictions to the jury before he has been con-
victed of the subsequent offense. There is a conflict between this
rule and recognized procedural safeguards. The fair rule of evi-
dence is that when a defendant chooses to remain silent, evidence
of prior crimes, unrelated to the one charged in the indictment,
cannot be introduced merely to show his inclination to commit the
crime charged' o or to impeach his character and reputation." The
Illinois rule, however, permits the defendant's character to be im-
peached in every instance, even though it is not properly in issue,
a practice which is prohibited in all but habitual offender prosecu-
tions.' 2 Furthermore, by permitting the introduction of irrelevant
6. See note 18 infra.
7. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, §602 (1953). "Whenever any person who has been
convicted of burglary, grand larceny, [etc.] .. . shall thereafter be convicted of any
such crimes, . . . the punishment shall be imprisonment in the penitentiary for the
full term provided by law for such crimes at the time of the last conviction there-
for; and whenever any such person having been so convicted of any of said crimes,
committed after second conviction, the punishment shall be imprisonment in the
penitentiary for a period not less than fifteen years: provided that such former
conviction, or convictions, . . . shall be set forth in apt words in the indictment."
(Emphasis added.)
8. Imprisonment in the penitentiary was made a requirement by the 1941 amend-
ment to the act. Commitment to the reformatory is insufficient to invoke the statute.
People v. Perkins, 395 Ill. 553, 70 N.E.2d 622 (1946).
9. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, §603 (1953).
10. People v. Wilson, 400 I1l. 461, 81 N.E.2d 211 (1948); People v. Buford,
396 Ill. 158, 71 N.E.2d 340 (1947).
11. 1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §57 (2d ed. 1923). If a defendant takes the stand and
testifies in his own behalf his credibility then becomes subject to attack and to the
same tests as are legally applied to other witnesses. People v. Hicks, 362 Ill. 238,
199 N.E. 368 (1935); People v. Johnson, 333 Ill. 469, 165 N.E. 235 (1929). The
only exception to this rule is when he offers, by other witnesses, evidence of his
good character, in which event the state may counter with evidence of bad char-
acter. People v. Holt, 398 III. 606, 76 N.E.2d 474 (1948) ; People v. Willy, 301 Ill.
307, 133 N.E. 859 (1922).
12. People v. Perkins, 395 Ill. 553, 70 N.E.2d 622 (1946). See also People v.
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evidence of prior misconduct before the jury's determination of the
immediate offense, the Illinois practice is contrary to the rule that
a defendant shall be tried solely on the merits of the principal
offense charged. Finally, the introduction of this evidence has a
tendency to rebut the presumption of innocence which the law
guarantees a defendant.
13
These objectionable features of the Illinois practice may have
two very prejudicial consequences. On the one hand, the jury or
the court may be so influenced by knowledge of defendant's crim-
inal record that all doubts regarding guilt in the instant case will
be resolved against the accused.14 On the other hand, a benevolent
jury, somehow apprised of the aggravated penalty required by a
finding of guilty on both counts, may refuse to return a verdict
because they are not in sympathy with the severity of such pen-
alty.' 5
Although Illinois courts have zealously guarded the rights of
second offenders who have not been charged under the habitual
criminal statute, the courts apparently disregard his rights when
the statute is invoked. Despite this patent injustice the Illinois
habitual criminal statute has withstood a barrage of constitutional
attacks since its inception in 1883.16 In light of the problems
arising under present Illinois procedure, the necessary inquiry is
what measures can be taken to afford a defendant more protection.
Since there seems to be no possibility of construing the present
Derrico, 409 Ill. 453, 100 N.E.2d 607 (1951); People v. Byrnes, 405 Ill. 103, 90
N.E.2d 217 (1950).
13. A defendant, charged under the habitual criminal statute is clothed with a
presumption of innocence, and this presumption also applies to the fact of his
former conviction. Mere proof of a record indicating identity of defendant is
insufficient to overcome this presumption, for the identity of the accused must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Casey, 399 Ill. 374, 77 N.E.2d 812
(1948).
14. A further danger is present under the rule in Illinois. The prosecution may
build its case upon the previous conviction of a defendant when its substantive
evidence is weak. A record of a previous narcotics violation and conviction would
be especially efficacious in a jury's determination of present guilt for a similar
charge. Also, under threat of invoking the statute, a prosecutor may force a
defendant to plead guilty to the present offense.
15. Illinois has solved this problem by the following practice: The jury is
given three possible verdicts-(1) Not guilty, (2) Guilty of the instant crime, (3)
Guilty of the instant crime and guilty on the habitual criminal count. By per-
mitting this lattitude the possibility of an acquittal is greatly diminished when the
jury feels that the aggravated penalty may be unjust in the circumstances.
16. The statute was held not to deny due process of law even though proof of
prior convictions prejudiced the accused in the eyes of the jury. People v. Manning,
397 Ill. 358, 74 N.E.2d 494 (1947), cert denied, 337 U.S. 949 (1949). Nor was the
Illinois statute held to violate due process of law because it gives the State's
Attorney discretion whether to allege prior convictions in the indictment. People
v. Johnson, 412 I1. 109, 105 N.E.2d 766, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 858 (1952). The
basic constitutionality of the act was upheld in People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499,
61 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731, rehearing denied, 327 U.S. 818 (1945).
Accord, People v. Johnson, 412 Ill. 109, 105 N.E.2d 766 (1952); People v. Pitts,
401 I1. 154, 81 N.E.2d 442 (1948).
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statute to eliminate its objectionable aspects, 17 it is suggested that
the Illinois legislature adopt a procedure which, by prohibiting the
introduction of damaging evidence, would protect a defendant's
rights. With this goal in mind the practices employed in other
jurisdictions will be examined and evaluated.
The Law in the Other American Jurisdictions
It is apparently permissible in all jurisdictions having habitual
criminal provisions to allege both the past convictions and the in-
stant offense in the same indictment or information. In a majority
of states the prior convictions must be alleged in the same pleading
if the habitual statute is to be invoked.18 The remaining jurisdic-
tions provide some alternative method.' 9
17. "It is sufficient to state, in answer to defendant's contention that what
seems to be a fair rule is practiced in the Federal courts, concerning the fact of
prior convictions being omitted from the indictment and the jury's consideration,
that such rule is founded on a specific statute governing such practice. This court
is without power to adopt such practice without the prior sanction of the legisla-
ture." People v. Hightower, 414 Ill. 537, 545, 112 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1953).
18. This is specifically required by statute or case law in the following states:
ARiz. CODE §43-6111 (1939); CAL. PENAL CODE §§969, 969a, 969b (Deering 1949);
COLO. STAT. c. 48, §551 (1935); CONN. GEN. STAT. §8785 (1949); DEL. CODE C. 11,
§3101 (1949); GA.-Berry v. State, 51 Ga. App. 442, 180 S.E. 635 (1935), Reid v.
State, 49 Ga. App. 429, 176 S.E. 100 (1934) ; IDAHO-In re Bates, 63 Idaho 748, 125
P.2d 1017 (1942), State v. Lovejoy, 60 Idaho 632, 95 P.2d 132 (1939) ; IND. STAT.
ANN. §9-2208 (Burns 1942); IOWA CODE ANN. §747.1 (1950); LA.-State v. Gani,
157 La. 235, 102 So. 319 (1924), State v. Compagno, 125 La. 669, 51 So. 681 (1910) ;
MASs.-Comm. v. Walker, 163 Mass. 226, 39 N.E. 1014 (1895); Mo.-State v.
Harrison, 359 Mo. 793, 223 S.W.2d 476 (1949); NEn. REV. STAT. §29-2221(2)
(1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-147 (1953), State v. Clark, 183 N.C. 733, 110 S.E. 641
(1922); OKLA.-EX Parte Bailey, 60 Okla. Cr. 278 64 P.2d 278 (1936); S.D.-
State v. Schaller, 49 S.D. 398, 207 N.W. 161 (1926); TEXAs-Lang v. State, 36
Texas 6 (1872); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-19 (1953); W. VA. CODE c. 61, §6131-19
(1949); Wyo. COMp. STAT. §9-111 (1945), Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d
514 (1950). In other states there is no specific requirement, but it is proper and
no alternative is provided. They are therefore included here: FLA. STAT. §775.11
(1941), Blitch v. Buchanan, 100 Fla. 1242, 132 So. 474 (1931), Cross v. State, 96
Fla. 768, 119 So. 380 (1928); Ky. REv. STAT. §431.190 (1953), Calhoun v. Comm.,
301 Ky. 789, 193 S.W.2d 420 (1946); MONT.-State v. O'Neil, 76 Mont. 526, 248
Pac. 215 (1926) ; NEv.-State v. Bardmess, 54 Nev. 84, 7 P.2d 817 (1932).
19. KAN. GEN. STAT. §21-107a (Corrick 1949) (making prior convictions de-
terminable by the court), Rutledge v. Hudspeth, 169 Kan. 243, 218 P.2d 241 (1950),
Pyle v. Hudspeth, 168 Kan. 705, 215 P.2d 157 (1950) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§28.1082-
28.1085 (1943), In re Brazel, 293 Mich. 632, 292 N.W. 664 (1940); MINN. STAT.
§§610.30, 610.31 (1949); N.J.-State v. Lutz, 135 N.J.L. 603, 52 A.2d 773 (1947);
N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 42, §§42-1603, 42-1604 (1941); N.Y.-People ex rel. Shepard v.
Martin, 267 App. Div. 1041, 48 N.Y.S.2d 697 (4th Dep't. 1944), but see People v.
Rosen, 208 N.Y. 169, 101 N.E. 855 (1913); N.D. REv. CODE C. 12, §5319 (1943);
OHIO REV. CODE §2961.13 (Baldwin 1953), but see §2949.34; ORE. ComP. LAws ANN.
§§26-2801-2804 (1939), State v. Smith, 128 Ore. 515, 273 Pac. 323 (1929) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. §5108 (Purdon 1945); TENN. CODE ANN. c. 20, §11863.5 (Williams 1951),
McCummings v. State, 175 Tenn. 309, 134 S.W.2d 151 (1939); VA. CODE §53-296
(1950), McCallister v. Comm., 157 Va. 844, 161 S.E. 67 (1931), but see §19-268 re
subsequent offenses of petty larceny; WASH. REV. CODE §9.92.090 (1952), State v.
Delano, 189 Wash. 230, 64 P.2d 511 (1937); Wis. STAT. §359.12(2) (1951); 65
STAT. 769, 26 U.S.C. §2557 (Supp. 1951). Some states included here provide that
prior offenses may be alleged in the same pleading, but provide no alternative.
Compare the states listed above with those in notes 20 and 21 infra.
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However, the method by which the habitual charge is made does
not necessarily determine whether evidence of a defendant's past
convictions will be admitted under prejudicial circumstances. It is
therefore necessary to examine three protective devices employed
in the various jurisdictions.
Several states permit the habitual count to be raised in a second
or supplemental indictment or information as an alternative method
of invoking the habitual provisions.20 Since the habitual charge is
not heard until after the defendant has been convicted of the instant
crime, this method can obviate the problem of prejudicial evidence.
However, it does not eliminate the prejudice unless it is actually
used. If this procedure is merely a permissible alternative, a prose-
cutor with a weak case on the instant offense will probably bring
both counts in a single pleading.
In some states a supplemental pleading is also employed when
a defendant's habituality is not discovered until after conviction
of a present crime.21 Similarly, a few states provide for amending
the original indictment or information to include an habitual count
when prior convictions are discovered during the course of the
trial.22 Neither of these practices entirely eliminates the prejudice
which results from permitting the jury to learn of the defendant's
prior convictions before they have determined the primary issue.
They both work entirely in favor of the prosecution, enabling it to
invoke the statute whenever the defendant's record is discovered,
but not preventing it from alleging and proving the habitual and
the primary charges concurrently. Amending the original pleading
is even less desirable since after the amendment the new court
must always be proved to the jury. In addition, the sudden intro-
duction of a new charge during the trial may jeopardize the whole
20. MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§28.1084, 28.1085 (1943); MINN. STAT. §§610.30, 610.31
(1949); N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 42, §§42-1603, 42-1604 (1941). A 1944 decision of the
Appellate Division indicates that this procedure may be followed in New York
also. People ex rel. Shepard v. Martin, 267 App. Div. 1041, 48 N.Y.S.2d 697 (4th
Dep't. 1944). However, the general practice in New York appears to be to allege
the prior convictions in the same pleading as the instant offense. People v. Rosen,
208 N.Y. 169, 101 N.E. 853 (1913); People v. Cuchiara, 209 App. Div. 326, 204
N.Y. Supp. 581 (3d Dep't. 1924).
21. Aaiz. CODE §44-2227 (1939) ; FLA. STAT. §775.11 (1941) ; LA. CODE OF CRIM.
LAW AND PROC. §709.3 (Dart 1943); MIcir. STAT. ANN. §28.1085 (1943); MINN.
STAT. §610.31 (1949); N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 42, §42-1604 (1941); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§1943 (Mc~inney 1944); OHIO REV. CODE §2961.13 (Baldwin 1953); ORE. ComP.
LAws ANN. §26-2804 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. §5108(d) (Purdon 1945); VA. CODE
§53-296 (1950). In those states where the supplemental pleading is available it
may apparently be used upon discovering prior convictions after the instant con-
viction. There are several states where it is clear that it may be so used, but it is
not clear whether it may also be used when the defendant's record was known at
the time the trial began. E.g., ARiz. CODE §44-2227 (1939) ; FLA.-Blitch v. Buchanan,
100 Fla. 1242, 132 So. 474 (1931) ; and, OHIO REv. CODE §2961.13 (Baldwin 1953).
22. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §969a (Deering 1949).
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defense, which might well have been quite different had the habitual
charge been made at the beginning.
Three states, in order to protect the defendant from prejudice,
do not permit the jury to be informed of his record until he has
been found guilty of the instant crime. 23 The jury then hears the
habitual charge. A few other states withhold the habitual count
from the jury only if the defendant pleads guilty to it,24 in which
case the count may neither be read to the jury nor referred to dur-
ing the trial. Both of these procedures are more desirable than the
usual one of permitting the jury to learn of a defendant's record
during his trial, but the latter affords no protection unless he ad-
mits the previous convictions. This might well have the effect of
compelling a plea of guilty to an habitual count. But since proof
of this charge is seldom difficult under modern methods of criminal
identification, a defendant appears to have much to gain and little
to lose by pleading guilty and removing this issue completely from
a jury's consideration.
In several states the habitual issue, whether the defendant has
been previously convicted as alleged, is a matter for determination
by the court alone.2 5 This practice prevents a defendant's record
from being used to prejudice the jury, since it is unnecessary to
bring the allegation or its proof to the jury's attention.26 Further-
more, this practice may be commended from both a legal and a
practical standpoint. Habituality goes only to the severity of the
sentence to be imposed. In most states this is a matter for the
court, and the habitual issue would, therefore, appear to be properly
23. CONN.-State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 Atd. 452 (1921) ; State v. Reilly,
94 Conn. 698, 110 At. 550 (1920); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-19 (1953); WASH. REV.
CODE §9.92.090 (1952), State v. Delano, 189 Wash. 230, 64 P.2d 511 (1937).
24. Apiz. CODE §44-1004 (1939); CAL. PENAL CODE §1025 (Deering 1949); Wis.-
State v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 326, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951).
25. ARiz. CODE §44-2227 (1939) (upon filing of criminal record with court at
any time after conviction); IowA CODE ANN. §747.4 (1950) (if plea of guilty to
instant crime); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §21-107a (Corrick 1949), Rutledge v. Huds-
peth, 169 Kan. 243, 218 P.2d 241 (1950), Pyle v. Hudspeth, 168 Kan. 705, 215 P.2d
157 (1950) ; LA. CODE OF CRIM. LAW AND PROC. §709.3 (Dart 1943), State v. Guidry,
169 La. 215, 124 So. 832 (1929) ; Nm. REv. STAT. c. 29, §29-2221(2) (1948). This
procedure may also be possible in Oregon and West Virginia. See State v. Smith,
128 Ore. 515, 273 Pac. 323 (1929); W. VA. CODE c. 61, §6131-19 (1949), State v.
Criss, 125 W. Va. 225, 23 S.E.2d 613 (1942).
In some states, however, a jury is specially impaneled for the purpose. E.g.,
ARiz. CODE §44-1004 (1939) (special jury if plea of guilty to instant crime) ; CAL.
PENAL CODE §1025 (Deering 1949) (same as Arizona); FLA. STAT. §775.11 (1941)
(special jury on supplemental information after conviction); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§28.1085 (1943) (special jury on alternative supplemental information); MINN.
STAT. §610.31 (1949) (same as Michigan); N.Y. PENAL LAW §1943 (McKinney
1944) (special jury on information after conviction); ORE CoMp. LAWs ANN.
§26-2804 (1940) (special jury on supplemental information); W. VA. CODE c. 61,
§6131-19 (1949) (special jury after conviction); 65 STAT. 767, 26 U.S.C. §2557
(Supp. 1952) (special jury after conviction).
26. Under this practice the defendant must be put on adequate notice that prior
convictions will be relied upon to aggravate his penalty, and he must be given a
hearing on this matter.
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left to the judge's determination. In addition, the issue of identity
is today solely one of written records which does not require a jury
determination. Such a procedure expedites the disposition of the
criminal calendar and it prevents a purely arbitrary finding of non-
identity by a jury unsympathetic with the increased penalties pre-
scribed for habituals.
There are apparently only five American jurisdictions that do
not have an habitual criminal provision-Arkansas, Maine, Mary-
land, Mississippi, and the District of Columbia. It seems unlikely
that antipathy to aggravated penalties for subsequent offenders is
the reason, for it is generally recognized that such penalties are
necessary and proper sanctions against repeated criminality.
Rather the reason may be that in these jurisdictions the court is
given fairly broad leeway in determining the length of the sentence
to be imposed.
Suggested Procedures
The choice of a new method of invoking habitual sanctions is a
difficult one, involving consideration of the several factors dis-
cussed above. There are a number of procedures from which a
choice can be made, all of which, it is believed, are preferable to
the present provision in Illinois.
I. Employ a two part indictment, one part setting forth the
present crime, the other the habitual count. The jury would first
hear evidence and determine guilt on the present crime. Then, and
only then, would it hear and determine the habitual charge. No
knowledge of the prior convictions would be brought to the jury's
attention until the first step was completed. The major objection
to this procedure would seem to be the possibility of an arbitrary
verdict on the second count. It might also have the effect of delay-
ing the disposition of a crowded calendar.
IL The court, rather than the jury, could decide the habitual
issue after a verdict of guilty on the first count. Under this method
there would be no reason for the jury to be informed of the de-
fendant's record. It has the advantage of avoiding arbitrary ver-
dicts on the second count and would also accelerate the disposition
of the case. However, it may be just as hard for a judge to avoid
prejudice from past crimes as it would be for a jury. It might be
contended that this practice deprives the defendant of his right to
a jury trial, but since the habitual issue goes only to the severity of
the penalty to be imposed, the issue being his conviction of previous
crimes but not his guilt thereof, there is no jury question.
III. The defendant could be tried as a first offender. Upon con-
viction, but before sentence, the prosecution would file a supple-
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mental indictment or information charging prior convictions. The
defendant would then be given an opportunity to plead to this
charge, and if he should plead not guilty, the question of identity
would be tried by a jury specially impaneled for the purpose. This
device would take the habitual issue from the hands of the original
jury, thereby eliminating a source of prejudice. The most weighty
objection to it is that it increases the time and expense necessary
for the final disposition of such cases, but the advantages would
seem clearly to outweigh this objection.
IV. After convicting the defendant of the latest offense, the
prosecution could introduce and authenticate a record of the de-
fendant's prior convictions. The defendant would be brought
before the court and ordered to show cause why he should not be
sentenced as required by the statute. If he could not show cause
the prescribed sentence would be imposed. Except in the very few
cases where a real question of identity is presented, this procedure
would result in a speedy disposition of the case, and the question
would be determined, if necessary, by a judge. Since habituality
goes only to the penalty, there would be no deprivation of trial by
jury.
V. The habitual criminal statute could be abolished. In Illinois
it is very seldom used. Furthermore, the Illinois criminal statutes
provide for indeterminate sentences whereby a judge is permitted
to assess minimum-maximum periods of imprisonment within pre-
scribed limits2 7 for every offense set forth in the habitual criminal
statute except kidnapping and rape.28 This fact, plus the recent de-
cision of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. King29 where a sen-
tence of one hundred and ninety-nine years to life was upheld, sug-
gest that an habitual provision is not the only way of aggravating
penalties for subsequent offenders. Therefore, it appears that the
habitual statute could be repealed and proportional severity im-
posed by indeterminate sentencing.
Conclusion
The defendant who is charged with a second crime has a right
to a fair and impartial trial according to the rules of law requiring
the exclusion of incompetent and prejudicial evidence. In Illinois
this is not possible, for he is openly indicted as an habitual criminal
27. The Illinois provisions for indeterminate sentence differ from the usual ones
under which the minimum-maximum is prescribed by statute. Under the Illinois
provision a judge is given discretion within the statutory limits prescribed. The
Illinois practice has the effect of delaying parole, thus avoiding the danger of
manipulations within a parole board. In determining the limits to set an Illinois
judge may consider both mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §801 (1953).
29. 1 Ill.2d 496, 116 N.E.2d 623 (1953).
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